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The first section of this paper reviews the most recent evidence on inequality in 18 Latin 
American countries and shows that in all but four the changes in inequality over the 
1990s were small and insignificant.  The distribution depends on the ownership and rate 
of return on assets, particularly human capital.  In the short run changes in these two 
variables tend to be offsetting-growth widens skill-differentials which is regressive, but 
advances in education are progressive.  The two effects roughly cancel each other out 
absent severe macroeconomic shocks or revolutionary changes in the rules of the game.  
The paper then summarizes various recent papers as well as the author’s recent work on 
the impact of structural reforms on inequality.  That work shows that the recent reforms 
have had a negative but small regressive impact on inequality mainly because many of 
the individual reforms had offsetting effects.  Trade and tax reform have been 
unambiguously regressive, but opening up the capital account is progressive.  Finally, the 
paper presents evidence of a significant slowdown in the growth rate and argues that 
given this fact and the insensitivity of the distribution to feasible policy measures, the 
main problem facing the region at present is not how to improve the distribution but 
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Latin America has long been known as the region with the most unequally distributed 
income in the world.  That was true in 1980 before the start of a decade of debt crises and 
recession that increased the degree of inequality even further.  At the start of the 1990s it 
was hoped that recovery and growth would improve the situation.  But that has not 
happened.  The most recent evidence suggests that at best inequality has stayed constant 
at the high levels of ten years ago, and  may well have gotten worse. (Székely and Hilgert 
1999a)  Recession and crisis exacerbated inequality, but recovery, growth and structural 
reform do not seem to have reversed those trends.   
 
In the first section of this paper we review the empirical distribution evidence for the 
1990s.  It shows either constant or rising inequality in most countries in the region.  In 
section two we examine the main determinants of the distribution and show why the 
distribution tends to be constant in the short run unless there are significant interventions 
or macroeconomic shocks such as hyperinflation or extended recession.  In section three 
we summarize several recent studies  which have attempted to link structural reform, 
growth and inequality.  These studies show quite convincingly that there has been a rise 
in the skill-differential in the 1990s, related to both the structural reforms and to 
increasingly skill-intensive growth.  But some decomposition results from my recent 
CEPAL study show that changes in inequality within different education groups and 
changes in education structure have to a large extent offset the regressive impact of rising 
wage differentials, the net result being that the distribution has been roughly constant in 
spite of the rising differentials.  Finally in section four we point out that falling or low 
rates of growth in most countries in the latter half of the 1990s strongly suggests that the 
main problem facing the region in the post-reform era is not how to improve the 
distribution of income but rather how to increase the growth rate of income.   
 
Section I:  Recent Distribution Evidence 
 
Figure One displays the most recent estimates for the Gini Coefficients for nineteen 
countries in the region.  Except for Argentina and Uruguay all the data are national, and 
except for Jamaica all measure the distribution of family income per capita.  A table with 
estimates over the 1990s for each country can be found in annex one. That data gives an 
idea of how inequality has changed over the first decade of trade and capital account 


















    Figure One: Gini Coefficients for a Recent Year 
 
Source:   Annex one.
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The first thing the data show is just how widespread high inequality is in the region.  
With the possible exception of Jamaica whose survey is based on expenditure rather than 
income, not another country in the region reaches even the median level of the Gini of 
Sub Saharan Africa, the most inequitable region in the world after Latin America.  Latin 
America’s high average inequality is not due to one or two outlying countries.  No less 
than 13/19 in the figure have Gini’s over .50, which is higher than the maximum Gini in 
all but 14 of the 88 non-Latin American countries in the World Bank data set. (See 
Deininger & Squire, 1996). 
 
What happened to inequality over the first post-reform decade?  From the region-wide 
averages shown in Londoño and Székely , there seems to have been little change.  In 
Miguel Székely’s words inequality is high and persistent in the region.  Over the decade 
as a whole inequality rose in eight of the countries for which we have the data and fell in 
eight and was constant in one.  But most of the changes are small.  (See annex  one and 
figure two)  In only four of the cases are the changes over 5% (i.e. about 2.5 percentage 
points on the Gini scale).  One of these is Jamaica where the survey is based on 
expenditures and the country was in recession.  A second case is Uruguay for which there 
is a major difference between two different sources (Székely and Hilgert 1999a, and 
CEPAL (1999) on whether inequality, rose, fell or stayed constant.  On balance on can 
say that inequality moved within a fairly narrow range for most countries in the region.   
 
The aggregates do hide some important details.  There is one group of six countries 
where inequality has risen sharply in the past and seems now to be stuck at a very high 
level.  That group includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,  Nicaragua,  Mexico and 
Panama.  Another two countries, Argentina and Venezuela, had fairly moderate levels of 
inequality at one time but have suffered a significant increase in the 1990s.  In another 
three countries, Honduras, Peru and El Salvador, there was some progress between 1990 
and 1995, but most or all of that has been reversed after 1995.  Finally there are two 
countries-Bolivia and Ecuador for which national data are only recently becoming 
available.  They are problems too because all of them have very high levels of inequality 
at the end of the decade.   
 
Not all the distribution evidence is negative.  On the positive side in Costa Rica and 
Uruguay inequality has fallen to levels found in developing countries.  Inequality is 
unlikely to fall much further in these two countries. That is not because growth in 
inequitable, but because there are lower limits to income inequality in any society.  
Finally there are three countries, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Paraguay in 
which there was a decline in inequality.  However the decline in Jamaica and Paraguay 
was the result of a severe and lengthy recession in which the rich lost more than the poor 
whose expenditures or income did not change much because they were living close to 
subsistence in the first place.   
 
When one adds all of this together what stands out is the extent and severity of the 
inequality problem.  There are only three countries with either low or declining levels of 
inequality and an adequate growth rate.  All the other fourteen countries have serious 
problems.  Either their inequality is stuck at a high level, has been rising significantly in  
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recent years or they are in serious recessions.  Unfortunately this problem group includes 
more than 90% of the population of the region.  And what is worse, there are few if any 
signs of improvement in the situation.  That is the reality and the core of the distribution 
problem in Latin America.  
Figure 2:  Percentage changes in distribution in the 1990s


















Percent Change in Gini in the 1990s 
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Section II:  Determinants of the Distribution of Income 
Since our interest here is the impact of growth and structural reform on the distribution, 
we start with the distribution of earnings.  This is the distribution that is most closely 
connected to economic influences.  But the reader should remember that the distribution 
most relevant for welfare comparisons is the distribution across families or individuals.  
That distribution depends on transfers, dependency ratios, family formation and other 
demographic variables in addition to all the factors affecting the earnings distribution.  
Those factors may either offset or emphasize the economic factors working through 
factor markets.   
 
In the short run the primary distribution is determined by the interaction of three factors: 
the quantity and ownership of factors of production, and the interplay of supply and 
demand for those factors.  What is critical to an understanding of persistent, high 
inequality is the role played by the supply and distribution of productive assets in the 
society.  There are four assets to consider-land, skilled labor, unskilled labor and capital.  
Two of these, skilled labor and capital, are scarce in Latin America which means that 
their rates of return are high, and all but unskilled labor are distributed unequally relative 
to either the industrialized countries or other developing areas.  It is this unequal 
distribution of scarce assets more  than  anything  else  which explains Latin America’s 
excess inequality.  The situation, no doubt, has been exacerbated by the relatively skill 
and  capital   intensive growth strategy of Latin America because that has raised profit 
rates and the return to education.  But that would not have mattered so much if the 
ownership of human and physical capital were more widely spread. 
 
Like other economic markets, prices are determined in factor markets by the interaction 
of the supply of each factor and the demand for factor services.  Markets clear at a price 
at which someone is willing to use the available supply of each of the factors.  That set of 
market clearing factor prices determines the relative price of skilled and unskilled labor 
and the rate of return on capital and land.  In the labor market, it may well be the case that 
demand is so low that many are forced to work part time in the informal sector or are 
unemployed altogether because the legally prescribed minimum wages in the formal 
sector exceeds the marginal product of fully employed labor force.  
 
On the demand side, economic growth, and expansionary macroeconomic policy shift out 
the demand for each of the factors which tends to raise each of their prices.  What 
happens to relative factor prices depends on the nature of the growth process. If it is skill 
intensive, skill differentials widen. If it is led by sectors such as agriculture which use 
mainly unskilled labor, the reverse should occur. Structural reforms change the 
composition of output by shifting output toward certain sectors and away from others. 
That is, the demand side determines the position of factor demand curves, which one 
would expect to depend negatively on own price and the price of complements, and 
positively on the prices of substitutes. 
 
The supply side is critical to understanding the dynamics of the process. In the short run 
the supply of factors is fixed because each of the factors is a stock which produces a flow  
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of services. That stock can change but that takes time. In the short run, demand factors  
such as the nature of the growth strategy, macroeconomic conditions and structural 
economic reforms have a predominant influence on relative incomes and the rate of 
return on capital and land.   
 
Another important feature of the distribution process is the dynamic feedback between 
factor prices and factor supplies through investment.  If there is a rise in the rate of return 
to physical capital, investment in physical capital increases.  Similarly if there is an 
increase in the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labor, or between 
university and high school graduates that will tend to increase the demand for university 
education.  Over time these investments will increase the supply of physical and human 
capital in the economy.  If there were no changes on the demand side, these supply side 
changes would drive down the rate of return and/or the skill differential.   
 
From the point of view of the earnings distribution, a rising skill differential which tends 
to increase inequality in the short run is also a signal which expands the supply of 
educated labor or physical capital in the long run. These long run changes on the supply 
side may well reverse the short run rise in inequality that induced them since they tend to 
drive down the rate of return to capital, both human and non-human. And for human 
capital one has to remember that the expansion in the supply of the well educated implies 
a rise in upward mobility for the young, more of whom will enter the labor market with 
university education instead of secondary or primary.  
 
There is thus an important distinction or ambiguity between the short run and the long 
run meaning of a rise in the skill differential or the rate of return to capital. In the short 
run an increase in either of these two is almost surely regressive. But in the long run, so 
long as the supply side reacts positively to these changes in the rate of return, the change 
could be progressive either because of upward mobility, or because the increase in 
physical capital drives down the rate of return and raises the productivity and the average 
wage of workers.  
 
The ambiguity we are discussing here is a specific example of the dual function of 
income in a market system. On the one hand relative income determines the distribution 
at each point in time. Any relative increase in the income of the rich is regressive. But on 
the other hand income is the signal or incentive by which economic agents are 
encouraged to change their behavior. A rise in the skill-differential induces socially 
desirable education investment. Similarly a rise in profits induces investment and a shift 
of productive resources from less desirable to more desirable uses. One makes a serious 
error of interpretation if one concentrates only on the short run regressive effect of 
changing factor returns without taking into account progressive long run supply 
responses.  
 
We turn now to a short discussion of the four factors of production that together 
determine the earnings distribution. 
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Physical Capital 
Could Latin America’s high inequality be the result of a higher profit share in the region? 
It is well know that the household surveys that we have been using as the basis for our 
measurement of inequality seriously underestimate total profit income.  Nonetheless they 
do contain some income from that source and, as would be expected, its distribution is far 
more skewed in favor of the rich than labor income. However because of underreporting, 
the total amount of income from this source is too small to significantly change the 
distribution.  The Gini of total income including distributed profits is less than one 
percentage point higher than the Gini of labor income alone.  This fact leads to two 
important conclusions.  First, the high reported inequality in Latin America comes mainly 
from inequality in labor income, not profits.  Second, because most profit income is not 
captured in the surveys, inequality in Latin America must be a good deal higher than 
what is reported in the household surveys. 
 
The Interaction Between the Distribution of Land and Unskilled Labor 
 
Latin America has always had the most unequal land distribution in the world.  In a 
recent study of land distribution in developing countries, four countries in the region 
topped the list.  They had the highest land distribution Gini Coefficients in the world.  
Eleven of the top 16 countries in the same list came from Latin America.  No Latin 
country was in the group of low or even medium inequality.  (Theisenhusen, 1995, p. 9).  
The FAO estimated that around 1970 the biggest 7% of land holdings in the region (those 
above 100 hectares) owned 77% of the land.  At the other extreme, the smallest 60% had 
only 4% of the land!  For Asia holdings over 100 hectares comprised 1.6% of all land, 
while 96% of farms had less than 10 hectares and that comprised 68% of all land.  
(Cardoso and Helwege, 1992, App. D.) 
 
The relevance of all this for income distribution is clear.  Countries with a very unequal 
distribution of land tended to have a low reservation wage for unskilled labor in the 
countryside, particularly as population growth increased in the twentieth century.  But 
that condition also meant low wages for the unskilled in the cities because of rural-urban 
migration.  There were a number of attempts to change this inequitable situation through 
land reform.  Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua are the most extreme examples, but 
there were also reforms in Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Colombia, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.  (Cardoso and Helwege, p. 261) 
 
In most cases these reforms did not reach a large fraction of landholdings, and nor did 
they equalize land ownership to a significant extent in most cases.  Either the reformed 




                                                
2 A reform will not be effective in redistributing land unless small farms have a productivity advantage that 
raises the reservation price above what a large landowner is willing to pay.  See Carter and Coles (1998) )  
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Rather than confronting the powerful landed oligarchs, the more typical solution was for 
the rural poor to escape to the cities by migration.  One could say that the cities became 
the safety-valve for the poor landless peasants from the countryside-just the opposite of 
the Turner hypothesis for the United States.  That by and large avoided violent 
confrontations, but at the cost of transferring inequality and low wages for the unskilled 
to the cities.   
 
Blocking access to land for the unskilled has the same effect as lowering the supply curve 
or the reservation wage.  That is why relative wages are so low in economies with a large 
supply of unskilled labor relative to the available supply of land.  To make matters worse, 
there has been a rise in the growth rate of the working age population since 1950 because 
of the lagged effect of reductions in the death rate.  In earlier periods the rate of growth of 
the population was low because the high birth rate was counterbalanced by an equally 
high rate of infant mortality and  a short life span.  The low growth equilibrium was 
broken, first by a reduction in death rates, then later by a reduction in the birth rate.  But 
there was a lag between the first and the second.  During that interval which 
demographers call the transition, there is a temporary rise in the rate of population 
growth.  That transition occurred in Latin America in the period between 1950 and about 
1980, with differences across countries.  The rate of growth of the labor force increased 
from 1.9%  in the 1950s to 2.3% in the 60s, 3.8% in the 70s and 2.9% in the 80s (Weller, 
p. 12).
3  School age population (0-14) peaked as a share of the total population around 
1970.  (Duryea and Székely, 1998, fig. 1) 
 
What all this has meant is a quite large increase in the size of young age cohorts in the 
period after 1950.  Those cohorts either had to be educated or absorbed into the labor 
force.  But for the most part the education system did not expand enough to absorb them.  
Instead, most entered the labor force with a low level of education and skills.  Thus the 
demographic transition increased the growth rate and the supply of unskilled labor in a 
region where lack of access to land and other productive inputs meant that they would 
flood the cities and drive down the wage for the unskilled.   
 
To make matters worse during that same transition period most of the countries in the 
region were pursuing a development strategy based on import substitution, and that 
implied a rapid growth in the demand for skilled labor and capital rather than unskilled 
labor.  The predictable result was a rise in informalization, stagnation in real wages for 
the unskilled, and a rise in the wage differential. Furthermore a backlog or oversupply of 
poorly educated workers was created which will have regressive effects on the 
distribution until it is finally eliminated by a combination of more rapid and hopefully 
more labor intensive growth, investments in education, and a gradual reduction in 





                                                
3 Increases in the participation rate particularly in the 80s affect the magnitude of the changes in the growth 
rate, and move the peak growth rate back to around 1980.  See Weller, p. 10.    
  9  
Human Capital or Education 
 
Education is one of the keys to the distribution puzzle.  Latin America has a highly 
unequal distribution of education and the highest skill differentials in the world. Dozens 
of studies have shown that a person’s level of education and experience are the major 
determinants of where one is likely to be found in the distribution of income.  (See in 
particular Birdsall and Londoño (1997) and Londoño and Székely (1998)) It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that a big part of the explanation for earnings inequality must lie in 
the educational profile of the population and in the skill differential. 
 
There is another puzzle here and that is how to explain Latin America’s high and 
persistent education wage differentials.  Surprisingly they cannot be explained by the 
relative scarcity of university graduates.  Compared to the typical Asian economy, the 
share of university graduates in the adult population is actually higher in Latin America.  
Yet the returns to university education are higher in Latin America than they are in Asia.  
Furthermore there has been a rapid expansion of university graduates in the labor force in 
Latin America since 1970, and yet, skill differentials have widened.  These facts are a 
critical part of why inequality has not decreased in the region.  But we don’t have a good 
explanation for why this expansion of supply has not driven down education differentials 
and rates of return to university education.   
 
Getting good historical or comparative data on wage differentials between skilled and 
unskilled labor or between different education groups is surprisingly difficult. Lora and 
Marquez (1998) compared white and blue collar average wages in Latin America and 
several other regions.  Their data show that the white collar differential in Latin America 
in 1982 was twice as high as the developed countries, and 50% higher than the four Asian 
tigers.  Since 1982 that differential has fallen everywhere but Latin America.  There, 
despite increases in the share of college and high school graduates, it has not fallen.  
Indeed it has risen sharply since 1988.  Behrman et al (2000) confirm this widening of the 
educational wage differential.  They ran earnings regressions for a large number of Latin 
American countries at two points in the 1990s,  and found that in eight of the ten 
countries for which he had data there was an increase in the differential between 
university and high school graduates and lower education groups. (the exceptions are 
Costa Rica and Panama)  Morley (2000) found the same pattern of widening skill 
differentials in the nine countries covered in his study, several of which were not in the 
Behrman et al study.  For whatever reason, there is a general consensus that wage 
differentials in favor of the educated have widened in the post reform period.    
 
To try to explain trends and patterns in relative skill differentials it is natural to ask about 
demand and supply.  We cannot directly observe the demand for skills, but we can 
observe supply.  If one looks at the educational profiles of the adult population in Latin 
America compared to countries in Asia, what stands out is the large proportion of 
university graduates in Latin America and the small number of adults with a high school 
education.  Most countries have succeeded in universalizing primary school education in 
the young cohorts entering the labor force.  Over time this has reduced fairly sharply the 
percent of the labor force without education.  But too many are still dropping out of  
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school to enter the labor market after completing primary school.  That is particularly true 
in countries like Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Bolivia where the 
education of the 1970 labor force was relatively poor.  As a result, a good deal of the 
progress in reducing the group with no schooling in those countries has been offset by an 
expansion of the group with no more than primary education.   
 
Where the Latin experience differs most sharply from Asia in the period since 1970 is in 
the rapid expansion of the university component, relative to secondary.  In Asia both the 
secondary school and university component practically doubled between 1970 and 1985.  
That is not the pattern in Latin America. There the share of university graduates 
expanded twice as fast as high school graduates.  Asia put a lot of its education dollars 
into eliminating the bottom tail of its educational distribution and universalizing 
secondary education.  Latin America let most of its young cohorts leave school after 
primary, using the money instead to expand university coverage.   
 
Two aspects of this difference between the two areas are important to us.  First Latin 
America has expanded the supply of university graduates in the labor force faster than 
Asia.   One cannot therefore attribute rising relative wages or returns to university 
education in Latin America to a failure to expand supply.   
 
Second, the university-intensive education strategy followed by Latin America has 
increased the variance in the ownership of human capital or what could be called 
educational inequality.  Trends in this variance are critical to understanding Itrends in 
earnings inequality.  For example, if there are very few university graduates in the 
population, the high wage differential earned by those graduates will not be an important 
factor in the distribution, because the overall education variance is low.  (Most of the 
population has a low education level.  When any country begins a process of upgrading 
the education of its population, one should expect educational inequality to increase as 
the education level of the younger cohorts improves relative to older cohorts.  Gradually 
over time that tendency will reverse as older cohorts retire and are replaced by better and 
more equally educated young cohorts.  But the Latin American educational strategy has 
delayed this turning point.  Not only is educational inequality still increasing in the 
region.  It is also increasing faster than would be expected compared to the experience of 
other countries.  A recent study (Londoño & Székely (1998)) shows the standard 
deviation of education rising along with education levels from just over three years in the 
60’s to over 4.5 years in the 90s.  That is over twice the increase in educational inequality 
that would be predicted from the increase in average education level over the same 
period.   
 
Rising educational inequality in the region is partly a result of the Latin education 
strategy.  On the one hand there was a substantial reduction in those with little or no 
education-the left hand tail of the distribution.  That was helpful.  But at the same time 
there was a significant expansion of university graduates-the right hand tail of the 
distribution.  That increased educational inequality given the relatively small size of the 
group at the beginning of the period.  To put it another way, in Latin America the 
expansion in education opportunities above the primary school level was limited to a 
small minority of new entrants.  By contrast, the Asian strategy expanded the group in the  
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middle, those with high school relative to the top, and of course more of their labor forces 
were in this group to start with.  In variance terms, Asia reduced the lower tail, and 
expanded the middle of the distribution, thus equalizing education over the labor force.  
Latin America did not.  Eventually the educational inequality trends will reverse in Latin 
America, as they have in Asia because intracohort inequality is now falling in almost all 
the countries in the region.  But the Latin American strategy of expanding primary and 
university at the expense of secondary has delayed the point at which overall educational 
inequality begins to decline in the majority of countries in the region. 
 
The distribution of income is related to both the return to human capital and to the 
variance in its ownership.  Both have increased in the last twenty-five years despite the 
sizable investments in education that have been made in Latin America.  So far, changes 
in the educational profile of the labor force in the region have not succeeded in reducing 
income inequality, and may have actually increased it.  There are in fact two factors at 
work here: the wage differential earned by better educated workers and the distribution or 
variance of education in the labor force.  One might expect the two to move together and 
usually they do.  That is, if one expands the supply of the educated, one should generally 
observe a narrowing in the skill differential.  But that is not happening in Latin America.   
 
It should be apparent that changes in the rate of return to education or the wage 
differential are the main channel by which the earnings distribution can change in the 
short run.  Upgrading the labor force through investments in education is a critical 
component in the social policy of any government.  But it takes a long time to have an 
appreciable effect on the distribution of earnings.  First of all it takes a long time for the 
newly educated to join the labor force, longer the lower the coverage of the education 
system to start with.  Second, even when these new graduates enter the labor force, at 
most they will add 2-3% to the stock of workers in the economy.  Those are not big 
enough changes to very quickly change the variance of education or the educational 
profile of the labor force.  For example, consider Costa Rica, a country with a progressive 
education policy.  In 1970 89% of its adult population had no more than primary 
education.  Fifteen years later that percentage had only dropped by 14%.  (Barro-Lee, 
1996).  The proportion of college graduates rose from 3% to 11%.  Those are substantial 
improvements, among the best in the region.  But they are too slow to alter the ownership 
profile of human capital much in the short run.  Therefore, if there is to be a significant 
change in earnings inequality from this source, it will have to come from changes in the 
rate of return to education-the wage differential.  But that, as we have seen, is moving in 
favor of the more educated.  
  
University graduates are one key to understanding the distribution puzzle.  This is the 
group best positioned to take advantage of the increasing skill-intensity of the modern 
economy.  Because they are in short supply, their earnings differentials are high-the 
highest in the world.  What is of more concern here is that there seems to have been a rise 
in the amount of inequality in the distribution of earnings accounted for or explained by  
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university graduates.
4  In fact the rise in the university group contribution to overall 
inequality in the Morley sample of countries was so great that it completely offsets 
favorable trends in the remainder of the population.   This is a striking confirmation and 
result  of increasingly skill-intensive growth in the 1990s.  Whether that is the result of 
the opening of the economy or whether in simply reflects changes in the nature of 
technology we cannot say.  Nor can we say with certainty that the pattern observed in our 
sample is representative of the other countries in the region.    
 
If one calculates the change in the university contribution to total inequality between the 
beginning and the end of the period in each of the countries in the Morley sample, one 
finds that in every case the absolute change for the university component is higher than 
the absolute overall change in inequality.  That tells us that in that group of countries  
rising inequality in the university group is responsible for all the increase in inequality, 
where there was an increase in inquality, or that offset progressive trends in the non-
university group where inequality was constant.   To put it another way, earnings 
inequality would have declined in the region in every country with the possible exception 
of Argentina had it not been for widening inequality in the university group, and between 
it and everyone else.  Skill-intensive growth in the new economic model strongly favored 
those few in the labor force with university education. 
 
Inequality and Growth 
 
We have so far been comparing snapshots of factor markets and skill differentials taken 
at different points in time without considering the economic forces that may be causing  
changes in the distribution of earnings.  Among various possible factors, the most 
important is growth itself.  What is the nature of the growth strategy and what effect does 
it have on factor markets and the distribution of income across the economy? 
 
The first thing to realize is that economies are heterogeneous and growth is a 
disequilibrating process that spreads unevenly across the economy.  Growth always starts 
in a particular sector or region and then spreads out or trickles down to the rest of the 
economy through a series of linkages.  Linkages are the connectors between the particular 
sector where growth begins and the other sectors and agents in the economy.  If those 
linkages are strong, the benefits of growth will be spread out and shared widely 
throughout the economy and the more equitable growth is likely to be.    If they are not, 
growth will be confined to the leading sector, and will probably exacerbate inequality.   
 
This notion can be applied in a variety of important ways in Latin America.  In some 
economies there are big backward regions or indigenous populations which are only 
weakly or marginally connected to the modern, dynamic sector where growth is 
occurring.  The Northeast and North of Brazil, the Andean region of Peru, or the 
indigenous areas of Southern Mexico are powerful and tragic examples of what we are 
                                                
4 For a fuller report on decompositions of changes earnings inequality for a nine country sample see 
Morley, (2000),  chapter 7.  the countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica 
Jamaica, Mexico and Peru.  
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talking about here.  In these three cases, and many more besides, linkages are weak.  The 
areas themselves have a significant proportion of  the nation’s population, which means 
that their relative income levels will have a noticeable effect on inequality. But for 
reasons that are not entirely understood, growth in the dynamic sectors does not induce 
much forward or backward linkage activity.  As a result, when these countries grow, 
there is not much of a spread effect to their backward or poor regions.  Growth under 
these conditions tends to be inequitable.  One could say that in these countries inequality 
is high because of growth, in the sense that if the entire country had remained in the same 
conditions as its backward regions, inequality would be lower. Here, growth leaves 
behind significant proportions of the population.  Growth always leaves some people 
behind, if one accepts the idea that growth starts in a particular sector or area of the 
country.  The key thing here is that if the linkages are weak and the areas left behind are 
large, then growth is likely to be inequitable. 
 
For the same reason, inequality is likely to rise with growth in counties with large 
indigenous populations.  Typically the links between indigenous people and the rest of 
the economy are weak.  When growth occurs, it provides little stimulus to incomes of the 
indigenous.  Conversely one could say that inequality is likely to be lower the smaller and 
more homogenous the economy.  Small countries with homogenous populations are 
unlikely to have backward regions or groups which are disconnected from the modern 
economy.  Examples are countries like Argentina and Uruguay where the bulk of the 
population lives in a small number of interconnected urban areas.  When this sort of 
country grows, a greater share of the population benefits because most people are linked 
either directly or indirectly to the sector where the growth stimulus began. 
  
If linkages and relative homogeneity are important one would expect urban income 
distributions to have a lower level of inequality than national distributions.  And they do.  
In a big cross section study (Morley 2000) we found the urban Ginis were systematically 
3-5 point lower than the national Ginis, and these differences were highly significant. 
Furthermore, if our reasoning about linkages is correct we might expect that the 
relationship between changes in income and changes in the distribution would be also be 
different in the urban sector. This expectation also turns out to be correct. Because 
linkages are higher across a greater fraction of the urban than the national population, the 
spread effects of growth are larger in the urban sector.  Growth tends to benefit more of 
the population of the cities.  It is not that growth doesn’t create wide income differentials 
between the dynamic leading sector and the rest of the urban economy.  Rather it is that 
the leading sector has a lot of backward and forward linkages within the remainder of the 
urban economy.
5    
 
All of this tells us that the economic structure of an economy will affect the relationship 
between growth and the distribution of income.  Of equal importance is the growth 
strategy followed by the country.  If a high proportion of growth comes from sectors 
which are big employers of unskilled labor such as construction or agriculture, it will be 
                                                
5 For the poor these feedbacks may be nothing more than an increased demand for guards, drivers, 
groundskeepers and servants all of which will be provided by the urban unskilled.  This is a trickle-down 
from growth that helps to reduce urban poverty.  
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equalizing.  The same should be true if the leading sectors are in backward regions.  
Conversely if the leading sector is mineral extraction, growth will more than likely raise 
inequality.  Mineral extraction activities have always been criticized for having weak 
links with the rest of the economy.  They do not employ many people directly nor do they 
buy much from the rest of the economy.  Thus there is not much spread effect from that 
sort of growth.   
 
The same could be said for a growth strategy heavily dependent on the use of skilled 
labor.  It will almost certainly increase the skill differential and raise inequality.  There 
are linkages from that sort of production, but they would mainly have to depend on the 
consumption expenditures of the skilled workers that are the direct beneficiaries of this 
sort of growth.  It is possible though unlikely that their demand for the services provided 
by the less skilled would be sufficient to make this style of growth equalizing. 
 
The government itself can play an important role in determining how big the linkage or 
spread effect of growth is.  First of all the government can generate a substantial amount 
of demand for the unskilled through construction projects because construction is one of 
the two sectors which intensively uses unskilled labor.  Government can also direct its 
spending to backward regions.  Thus even if the basic growth dynamic comes from the 
extraction of minerals or from skill-intensive exports, the government can use the tax 
revenues generated by those activities to finance construction projects or other activities 
such as basic health care, education or direct transfers that will help the poor.  Here the 
government acts as a conduit by which some of the revenues from production in the 
leading sector reach the poor, the unskilled or backward regions of the country.   
 
To summarize, whether or not growth is equalizing depends on three things: 1)  the 
structure of the economy, in particular how big and heterogeneous it is, and how much 
skilled and unskilled labor it has; 2) the type of growth strategy being followed and the 
characteristics of the leading sectors; 3) how much the government does to increase the 
spread effects of growth.   
 
The Impact of Structural Reform 
Latin America has undergone massive structural reform in recent years.  These reforms 
started in the Southern Cone in the 1970s and spread throughout the rest of the region 







































What might one expect the effect of these changes to be on equity? `When one stops to 
think about the entire reform package, the broad thrust is to remove any sort of insulation 
from the market determination of the allocation of resources.  Commercial reforms 
remove tariff protection to domestic production, financial reforms and privatization 
reduce government influence over the allocation of resources. Balance of payment 
reforms integrate foreign and domestic capital markets and reduce the capacity of 
government to control capital movements.  Similarly, labor market reform increases labor 
flexibility or to put it another way, reduces labor’s ability to defend against either market-
driven fluctuations in demand, or alternatively wage reductions.   
 
One of the key features of the neo-liberal reforms in Latin America has been to reduce 
tariffs and increase the reliance on exports.  According to standard trade theory such a 
reform should help unskilled labor because it is relatively abundant in the region.  But as 
we have seen it does not seem to have worked out that way in practice.  Wage 
differentials are rising almost everywhere in spite of rising supplies of the more educated.   
While an increase in wage inequality does not necessarily translate into an increase in 
inequality of total income, these results suggest caution in accepting the assertion that 
trade should help countries with large supplies of unskilled labor.   
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One should not ignore the demand side in considering this question.  The purpose of 
commercial reform is to switch the production of tradables away from inefficient import 
substitutes to exportables in which countries have a comparative advantage.  The 
connection to the distribution of income comes from the differences in factor demands 
between these two types of products.  That is a relative factor-intensity strory.  But there 
is a demand-side to consider as well.  The success of the old import-substitution, inward-
looking development strategy depended to a large extent on a growing internal market.  If 
there is going to be satisfactory growth in that sort of strategy, there has to be a growing 
middle class with growing purchasing power.  Growing real wages are an integral part of 
that strategy.  The mature capitalist economies long ago discovered that both the owners 
of capital and their workers could profit from a strategy in which  rising wages increased 
both costs and profits at the same time because of increases in the size of the internal 
market induced by rising wage payments.   
 
The export-led growth strategy is completely different from this.  Its success depends on 
controlling costs.  The internal market is irrelevant.  Rising real wages are a clear threat 
to growth in the export model.  They do not have the positive indirect effect through 
demand that they have in the inward-looking growth strategy.  Countries embarking on 
the outward-looking growth path are making their wage levels hostage to wage levels and 
labor costs in other countries.  It may well be that the advantages of greater efficiency in 
export production than import-substitutes outweigh the disadvantages of this wage 
competition so that workers are better off.  But that certainly is not immediately obvious, 
particularly in the large economies.  
 
What is the likely effect of liberalizing the capital account?  What this reform does is to 
integrate more closely the local and international capital markets making local interest 
and profit rates, adjusted for risk, closer to rates in the rest of the world.  Whether or not 
this is progressive depends on the reactions of foreign and domestic owners of capital.  If 
foreign investors have been deterred from a country because of controls on capital and 
profit repatriation, the reforms should induce a foreign capital inflow. The distributional 
effect of this is ambiguous.  Wage/profit ratios should fall because of the rise in the 
capital/labor ratio.  That is progressive.  But at the same time if capital and skilled labor 
are complementary, the skill differential will rise which is regressive.  A similar 
ambiguity results from the actions of domestic owners of capital.  Part of the 
liberalization of the capital account was to lift restrictions on capital outflows by 
domestic savers and investors.  If there was an excess demand for foreign exchange under 
capital controls, the reforms should cause a capital outflow, with results just the reverse 
of those described for foreign capital inflows.  
 
Aside from the effect of these reforms on factor supplies and factor demands, removing 
barriers to capital movements increases the bargaining power of capital in its negotiations 
with both labor and the government.  That is likely to be regressive.  For if investors are 
free to move from one country to another, government will find it far more difficult to tax 
capital or to pass regulations that force businesses to shoulder more of the cost of 
infrastructure or labor regulation.  Indeed, in a world of perfect capital mobility, countries 
will be forced to compete in offering generous tax holidays, subsidized credits and other  
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costly assistance as a way of attracting foreign capital.  But it is not only foreign capital 
that is affected.  The same argument is valid for domestic capital.  Both government and 
labor will be forced to accept arrangements that are sufficiently generous that domestic 
entrepreneurs and holders of wealth are content to leave their money invested in their 
home country.  In this way, opening up the capital account shifts the balance of power in 
favor of the holders of capital.  This is one of the reasons why there has been a shift away 
from the taxation of corporate profits and a big reduction in the top marginal income tax 
rate in most Latin countries in recent years. 
 
Financial reforms, the third component of the typical reform package, eliminated controls 
on interest rates, reduced compulsory reserve requirements of banks and reduced the use 
of directed or subsidized credit.  The direct effect of this on the distribution is probably 
small, but to the extent that these reforms increased private saving and investment, they 
were probably progressive.  
 
The fourth component of the reform project is tax reform. Two major components have 
been widely adopted.  The first was the value added tax.  Reformers favored this tax 
because they argued that while all taxes have distorting effects on private decisions, these 
are less with an across the board VAT than for either tariffs or high marginal income tax 
rates.  In addition of course, there should be less tax evasion with a VAT than with an 
income tax based system.  The VAT was introduced in the 1970’s in nine of the 17 
countries for which we have data.  In the 1980’s the VAT was adopted in all the 
remaining countries in the region and in addition, there was an increase in the coverage or 
efficiency of the VAT in most countries. 
 
A second element of tax reform was the reduction in marginal tax rates on corporate and 
personal income, which significantly reduced the progressivity of the income tax. Every 
country in the region has reduced its top marginal tax rate since 1970. Not all have gone 
as far as Uruguay, which eliminated the personal income tax altogether, but overall the 
average marginal rate on personal income, has fallen from around 50% in 1970 to about 
25% in 1995.  The corporate rate has fallen from 37% in 1970 to 29% in 1995.  Almost 
all these changes have taken place since 1985.  
 
From the distribution perspective, the effect of these changes in the tax system was to 
shift the burden of the tax system away from the wealthy and toward the middle and 
lower classes. The introduction and later expansion of the value-added tax was a shift 
away from the taxation of income toward the taxation of consumption.  Since the poor 
consume a greater fraction of their income than the rich, this change must have been 
regressive, except in certain countries which exempted basic necessities from the tax.  
 
Changes in the income tax amplified the trend toward greater regressivity.  Top marginal 
tax rates on personal income were lowered and the corporate tax rate was cut by over 
20%.  While a full analysis of the incidence of all these changes in beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is almost certain that they were regressive. 
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Another important component of reform in the region was privatization.  State enterprises 
were a key component of the old development model which has been dramatically 
redesigned by the reforms we are analyzing.  The impact of privatization on the 
distribution depends on three elements.  First whether or not the sales price of the assets 
of the state-owned enterprises reflect their true market value.  If it is less, buyers have 
received a gift from taxpayers.  Second, for public utilities like electricity, telephone and 
water companies, the impact depends on what happens to the price of the services they 
provide to the public.  In many cases publicly-owned utilities subsidized their customers 
by selling below cost.  Transferring that sort of company to the private sector and 
eliminating the subsidy could be either progressive or regressive, depending on whom 
their customers were.  It is probably the case that most of this sort of subsidy benefited 
the middle class.  
 
Another effect of privatization is on labor demand and employment.  Labor productivity 
in the typical SOE was low.  For political reason many governments seemed more 
interested in using these enterprises to create jobs than to provide good service at the 
lowest possible cost.  When the SOEs were sold, all of this had to change.  Privatizations 
in places like Chile and Argentina were blamed for a good deal of the job destruction and 
rising unemployment that accompanied reform.  The distributional impact of this depends 
on who the displaced employees were.  There is no good study of this question, but 
judging by the profile of the labor force of the typical SOE, these jobs came in large part 
from the middle of the earnings distribution.  Thus privatization is likely to have mainly 
hurt the middle class, both because they were the main users of subsidized SOE services 
and also the main employees of State-owned firms 
 
Section III:  Emprical Evidence on the Impact of Growth and Reform 
Separating the impact of the reforms on the distribution of income from all the other 
factors which affect it, and which have been changing at the same time that the reforms 
have been implemented. is an exceedingly complex undertaking.  Simple comparisons of 
Ginis before and after the adoption of reform is clearly inadequate, and researchers have 
relied on two alternatives-econometric estimation and counterfactual exercises.  The 
conclusion of both approaches is similar.  The structural reforms have been regressive, 
but their effect is relatively small and not particularly robust or significant.   
 
Trade reform is the area which has been most widely studied.  Wood (1995) argues that 
the experience of E. Asia in 60’s and 70’s supports the theory that greater openness to 
trade tends to narrow the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in developing 
countries.  In Latin American, since the mid 80’s however increased openness has 
widened wage differentials.  Wood (1997) thinks that this conflict of evidence is probably 
not the result of differences between E. Asia and Latin America.  Rather it is the result of 
differences between the 1960’s and the 1980’s, specifically the entry of China into the 
world market and perhaps the advent of new technology biased against unskilled 
workers. 
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Spilimbergo, Londono and Székely (1997) point out that what really matters is each 
country’s factor endowments, including land relative to the average world effective 
supply of each factor. They  find that trade openness is associated with higher inequality-
holding endowments constant. But the effect depends on the relative abundance of each 
type of factor.  Inequality increases in countries that are relatively well endowed with 
skills, but it declines in countries which are well endowed with physical capital and land.  
Since in their sample, factor endowments in Latin America are relative close to world 
averages, the effect of opening on inequality is modest-a rise of 10% in their openness 
index only raises the average Gini Coefficient by .63 of a point. Latin America, in their 
empirical specification, does not have a high level of unskilled labor relative to the 
weighted average of the factor endowments of the rest of the world which is consistent 
with the entry of China and other large Asian countries into the world trading system.  If 
true, that would explain why openness has not reduced the wage differential.   
 
Behrman, Birdsall and Székely (2000) collected data on wage differentials across 18 
Latin American countries for the period 1980-1998.  They then ran a series of panel-cross 
section regressions using indexes of the structural reforms as explanatory variables.  They 
found that the overall average reform index had a regressive and significant effect on 
wage differentials, although there is some indication that this effect fades away over time.  
When they ran the regressions with indexes for each of the individual areas of reform, 
they found that all of the regressive impact of reform came from three areas, capital 
account liberalization, financial market reform and tax reform.  Curiously trade reform 
itself had no significant effect on the skill-differential and privatization tended to narrow 
differentials.  Note here that this study was concerned with wage differentials not the 
distribution of earnings or of income per capita.  The three may or may not move in the  
same direction either because of structural changes in the supply of labor of the effect of 
unemployment and transfers.  
 
 Ganuza, Paes de Barros and Vos (2000) summarized the results of a recently-completed   
set of case studies for 17 countries in Latin America of the impact of trade and capital 
account liberalization.  This study is based on a comparison of the observed household 
distribution in some recent post-reform year with what the distribution would have been 
had there been no reform.  The counterfactual mimics the labor market structure and 
relative wages of some pre-reform year by  a probabilistic reassignment of the observed 
labor force across sectors, occupations, employment status, and wage groups so that the 
structure of the post-reform year is identical to that of the pre-reform year.  They find that 
the effect of the reforms is quite small.  In all they studied 31 reform periods in 17 
countries.  In 15 of those 31 cases inequality went up with the reforms, and in the other 
16 it either went down (15 cases) or stayed the same (1 case).  Most of the simulated 
changes in distribution either up or down were small.  In 17/31 cases the change was less 
than 3% and in 11 it was less than 1%.  Finally, they find that it is changes in relative 
wages that explain most of whatever change in distribution there was, not changes in 
occupational and sectoral structure, participation rates or unemployment.   
 
Morley (2000) in a recent study attempted to relate the reforms directly to the distribution 
of household income by estimating an econometric model in which both the reforms and  
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other variables were introduced as explanatory variables. He used a large panel 
crossection of  261observations in 16 countries over the period 1960 to 1997.  The 
sample uses observations over a long period of time to capture the effect of growth and 
the adoption of the reforms, and it also includes many other variables such as education 
structure which are thought to have a significant impact on the distribution.  A fuller 
description of the study and results can be found in Morley (2000a). 
 
He drew three main conclusions from the study. 
 
1.  There appears to be a robust and significant relationship between the distribution 
and income.  But it is not linear.  Rather it has an inverted U shape.  That means 
that other things equal, growth in low income countries is very likely to increase 
inequality until they reach the income level of Colombia or Costa Rica.  There are 
only seven or eight countries in the region whose income is high enough for 
growth to drive down inequality.   
2.  Growth seems to be systematically less equitable than it used to be.  In those 
countries where growth is equalizing, it is now less so than before.  In countries 
where growth increases inequality, it now does so more than it used to.  While 
one cannot be sure of the reasons for this unfortunate result, it appears to be 
related to the increasingly skill-intensive nature of growth in the region.  Growth 
has widened wage differentials and raised the rate of return to education, 
particularly at the high school and university level.  This evidence is absolutely 
consistent with the evidence discussed above that in a decomposition of changing 
inequality in a nine country sample, we found that it was solely because of the 
university group that inequality did not decline in the region.  Growth in the 
globalized, modern world is putting an increasing premium on the skills of 
university graduates.  It is driving up their relative wages even though the supply 
of university graduates is also increasing rapidly. That means that it is becoming 
more and more difficult in Latin American conditions to produce growth with 
equity.  
3.  In the aggregate the reforms appear to have a regressive effect on the distribution 
but the effect is both small and only marginally significant.  The reason is that 
reforms in different areas have offsetting effects on equity.  Trade reform is 
regressive in all of the specifications, but it is insignificant in all but the national 
sample. Tax reform is unambiguously regressive, and opening up the capital 
account is unambiguously progressive.  The results for tax reform and capital 
account liberalization are the most robust and significant that he had. For the other 
two reforms, the data was not good enough to give a clear answer. In three of the 
reforms, there are changes of sign and significance between the regressions on the 
level and the change in inequality, but only one, the capital account, is significant.   
He concluded that the reforms, taken together are mildly regressive, but that their 
effect on the distribution is relatively small compared to other factors like growth, 
inflation and changes in education structure.  These results are consistent with 
those obtained in the Ganuza et al study. 
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Section IV:  Inertia in the Distribution 
Unfortunately it does not appear that the distribution statistics will improve very much if 
at all with growth. One of the reasons is that growth is more skill-intensive now than it 
used to be.  This may be simply a Latin phenomenon, but it is more likely that it reflects 
changes in technology that are being felt all over the world. The skill-differential or wage 
premium paid to high school and college graduates has risen in almost every country for 
which we have data.  Consistent with this phenomenon, we found quite strong evidence 
that the relationship between income and equity is becoming less progressive.  Growth 
that could have been expected to reduce inequality in the 1970’s no longer does so in the 
production conditions of the 90s.   
 
The rise in the skill differential is mainly a result of the nature of labor demand and the 
pattern of growth of labor supply.  Growth is going to increase the relative demand for 
skilled labor.  The education system will be sending better prepared graduates out into the 
labor market, increasing the supply of skilled or potentially skilled workers.  Whether the 
skill differential rises or falls depends on which of the two grows most rapidly.  But even 
in the most progressive imaginable scenario, there is unlikely to be a large enough 
reduction in the wage differential to make a significant difference in the overall 
distribution of earnings.  Here the case of Chile is instructive.  It has grown very rapidly 
since 1987, and has had a small reduction in its skill differential,  But even that narrowing 
was not sufficient to cause a significant reduction in inequality.  Barring sudden drastic 
shifts in external conditions or macroeconomic shocks, the earnings distribution is mainly 
determined by the structure of the labor force, and that changes slowly. Because Latin 
America in the past did not broaden the coverage of high school education, it now has an 
adult labor force which has far too many undereducated workers who are ill-equipped to 
work in an increasingly information-based work place.  Until that imbalance can be 
eliminated, growth is likely to cause rising wage-differentials in favor of those with high 
school or university education.   Correcting that imbalance is one of the priority tasks 
facing the region.  
 
Paradoxically, improving the education structure of the labor force could in the short run 
make the distribution get worse rather than better.  Morley showed that in the case of 
Brazil, countries with a very small fraction of high-school or university graduates in their 
labor forces will find that inequality will go up when they raise that fraction unless they 
are able to significantly lower the skill-differential at the same time.  Of course, reducing 
the proportion of poorly educated workers at the same time helps to offset this perverse 
effect, but it does not eliminate it altogether. 
 
One could say that this change in educational structure improves the position of the right 
and left hand tails of the distribution.  At the top, both the number and the income share 
increase.  That is regressive.  At the bottom, the number and size shrinks, and that is 
progressive.  In turns out that in those countries where we had the data to study the 
process, these progressive and regressive effects seem to just about offset each other.  
This is one of the principal reasons why the overall distribution has not changed much 
despite substantial growth and structural change.   
 22  
Another reason why distributions have not improved with growth is because of the very 
nature of the growth process and the structure of the economy.  In some cases growth is 
more skill-intensive than it need be.  That exacerbates the tendency toward rising wage 
differentials.  In other cases economies themselves are heterogeneous. Growth starts in a 
dynamic sector or region, but has low regional or sectoral multiplier effects elsewhere.  
There are many examples of such heterogeneity in Latin America, from backward 
regions, groups of indigenous people, or concentrations of the unskilled who are unable 
to perform the tasks needed in the dynamic sector.  In all those cases growth is relatively 
disequalizing.  Its spread effect or trickle down is small. 
 
Section V:  The Problem of Finding Sustainable and Rapid Growth 
 
Despite all the attention being given to the relationship between growth and the 
distribution of income, recent history in Latin America suggests that the more serious 
question now is the growth rate itself.  In most countries in the region, growth in the 
1990s has been disappointing, lower by a considerable margin than the averages attained 
in the decades before the debt crisis and before the adoption of structural reform.  What is 
worse, there has been a significant slowdown in growth since 1995, particularly in South 
America.  While it is too early to tell whether this slowdown is temporary or permanent, 
there seems little doubt that a slowdown in exports is a big part of the problem.   
 
For a time, prior to the Tequila Crisis in 1995, things seemed to be going well.  Growth 
rates were much higher than they had been in the 1980s, and for some countries were 
even higher than they had been in the long period between World War II and the debt 
crisis.  Things were expected to get even better in the following years since in many 
countries the reforms had only recently been adopted and since it takes time to reap their 
full benefits.   
 
But it is not working out that way for most of the countries in the region. (See Table one) 
Instead of accelerating, growth has declined, especially in the countries of South 
America.  Overall average per capita income growth between 1990 and 1995 was 2.9% 
per year.
6  That rate fell to .8% per year between 1995 and 1999.  Only two countries 
(Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican Republic) did better in the last five years than 
they did in the previous four, and both of them are in the Caribbean. 
 
This decelaration of growth is particularly pronounced in South America.  Over the entire 
decade 91-99, growth in South America was 1.6% per year, in Central America 1.4%.  
But in the last five years growth in South America has fallen to .5% per year while in 
Central America and the Caribbean it fell to only 1.2% per year.  The 95-99 period was 
for South America a period of recurrent recessions in some countries (Argentina and 
Peru) and protracted recession in others (Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador and 
Venezuela (also Jamaica).  If one defines a recession year as one in which per capita 
income declines, the South American countries were in recession 40% of the time 
                                                
6 That is, for the years 1991-1994.  
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between 1995 and 1999.  In Central America the comparable figure was 20%, or 
excluding Jamaica, only 12% of the time.   
 
In thinking about growth rates or evaluating country performance, it is appropriate to 
compare  current with past performance avoiding periods of extreme volatility.  One is 
looking for estimates of long term growth rates which one cannot obtain from periods of  
   
 
 
Source:  For 1950-80, IMF and CEPAL, for 1990-98, CEPAL. 
 
recession and recovery.  For Latin America that suggests a comparison of growth in the 
1990s with growth in the thirty year period 1950-80 period to the debt crisis.  (See table 
one)  As the reader can see from the table, only five of the nineteen countries for which 
we have data significantly improved their performance. (Argentina, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Peru and Ecuador)  Growth rates in Bolivia and Panama are about the same, 
and the rest of the countries are doing worse than they used to do.  If one looks at just the 
last five years, there are only four countries whose performance is better than the base 




argentina  1.572 3.300 0.827 2
Bolivia 1.431 1.400 1.338 1
Brazil 4.016 1.000 0.734 2
chile 2.056 4.400 3.222 1
Colombia 2.402 0.500 -0.845 2
C. Rica 3.142 1.200 1.175 2
Ecuador 4.083 -0.200 -1.647 2
El Salvador 2.843 2.300 1.201 1
Guatamala 1.842 1.500 1.438 0
Honduras 1.375 0.200 -0.126 1
Mexico 3.388 1.300 0.895 1
Paraguay 2.637 -0.600 -1.300 4
Peru 1.864 2.900 2.576 1
R. Dom. 2.652 3.100 4.294 0
Uruguay 0.865 2.400 1.414 2
Venezuela 2.373 -0.300 -1.411 3
Jamaica 2.329 -0.500 -1.589 4
T+T 6.774 2.300 2.781 0
Panama 2.738 2.800 1.468 0
2.652 1.526 0.866 0.3053
3.009 1.420 1.154 0.2000
2.330 1.644 0.545 0.4000





Growth rates in GDP per capita 
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period and nine for which per capita growth is now at least 2% per year below the base 
period.  In short, in the last five years something seems to have gone wrong especially in 
South America.  What could it be?  
 
It does not appear that the problem is a decline in capital formation, except in the three oil 
exporters: Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela where both investment and 
growth have fallen sharply.  Of the remaining 16 countries all but three increased their 
investment rate and for the region as a whole, gross investment as a percentage of GDP is 
slightly higher in the 1990s than it was in the base period.   But the problem is that 
investment is not as productive in producing growth as it used to be.   
 
Exports Are Not a Very Dynamic Leading Sector in Most Countries 
Probably the biggest single change in the growth strategy in Latin America has been the 
replacement of import substitution by exports.  There has been a dramatic reduction in 
tariff rates and other forms of protection.  It is not clear how this was expected to lead to 
an increase in exports, but there is no doubt that this was the expectation.  In most 
countries exports were the biggest source of demand growth in the 1990s, adding more 
than 100% to the net increase of GDP in 8 countries and more than 50% in an additional 
six.  Brazil is a significant exception to this general pattern as is Honduras.  
 
Critics of trade liberalization have charged that the rise in imports more than offsets the 
expansionary effect of increased exports.  There appears to be some truth in this charge 
but only for a small number of countries mainly and specifically Argentina and Brazil.  In 
both of these countries, highly protected domestic manufacturing was penalized both by 
trade liberalization and currency appreciation.  For them as well as Paraguay and 
Uruguay, the external sector was a drain on domestic production. In 11 of the remaining 
13 countries that is not the case.  For each of them export growth exceeded, sometimes by 
a wide margin, the negative effect of rising imports.   
 
What Explains the Downturn in Growth After 1995? 
As noted as the outset of this paper, there has been a significant downturn in growth in 
the region since 1995.  All but two of the countries in our sample grew more slowly in 
the last four years than they did in the previous five.  The slowdown is particularly severe 
in the last two years.   
 
The main reason for this deterioration in performance is a serious and widespread decline 
in exports affecting almost every country in the region. (See table 2) That reduction has 
forced most economies onto a slower growth path in order to reduce the volume of 
imports and conserve foreign exchange.  There are exceptions to this pattern of course, 
the most important being Mexico.  The good performance in Mexico, Costa Rica and the 
Dominican Republic hides the bad performance of the export sector 
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elsewhere.  Exports rose by 22% between 1997 and 1999 in those three economies but 
fell by 9% in the rest of the region.  That permitted a 26% rise in imports for the three 
and forced a 16% decline elsewhere.  (See table 2)  Part of the poor export performance is 
related to the collapse of oil prices in 1998 and 1999.  But that is not the only 
explanation.  Every country in Latin America suffered a reduction in exports with the 
exception of Colombia where they were approximately constant.  Every country in 
Central America north of Panama had an increase in its exports.  Mexico and Costa Rica 
are only the biggest gainers in this regard.  If one splits the region by those countries 
south and north of Panama, the contrast in performance is even more stark than that 
shown in the table.  South America and Panama  had a 10% reduction in exports and a 
17% reduction in imports compared to a gain of 21% in exports and 26% in imports for 
their northern neighbors. 
 
Most of the difference in performance between Central and South America undoubtedly 
relates to the internal conditions in their main respective export markets.  South American 
exports go primarily to Asia and Europe, while Central America’s and the Caribbean’s go 
to the United States.  Japan and Europe has had a period of slow growth.  Meanwhile the 
United States has been in an extended boom period.  These relative trends outside the 
region must have been reinforced by slow growth in Brazil, a major export market for 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.   
 
 
The contribution of falling exports to the growth slowdown in South America did not 
come from the sort of destructive import substitution that we discussed earlier.  That is 
import substitution was not displacing domestic production and causing recession except 
possibly in Argentina and Brazil. Overall we can see from table two that the reduction in 
imports in the slow growing areas exceeded the reduction in exports.  If one calculated 
the ratio of imports to income, there is not a single country in South America in which 
 
199 199 199 199
Latin  32686 33985 35686 35955
Costa  547 815 569 754
D.  706 811 778 958
Mexic 12183 14830 12242 15462
sub  13437 16456 13589 17174
C Amer+Caribbean  
north of Panama  14279 17357 14728 18533
South  18406 16627 20958 17421
Table 2: exports and imports 
total  total 
Rest of 
Americ 19249 17529 22096 18781
Source:  Balance Preliminar de las Economias de América Latina y el  
Caribe, CEPAL (1999).  In millions of current dollars.  
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that ratio increased as their growth either slowed down or went negative between 1997 
and 1999.  Where the foreign sector exerted a contractionary influence, it was falling 
exports and not rising imports that were the reason.  What the experience of South 
America in the last several years has shown is that the export-led growth model can as 
easily become an export-led decline when there is a significant contraction in countries’ 
external markets. 
 
Exports have not provided the dynamic growth needed to produce really rapid income 
growth, in most countries in the region, particularly those in South America.  Partly that 
is because markets in developed countries for the goods produced by developing 
countries have not been growing as rapidly as they did earlier.   (only 4.8% between 1995 
and 1998  compared to 9.7% per year between 1991 and 1995). But there is another 
factor at work and that is that Latin America is losing market share as well.  Between 
1995 and 1998 Latin American exports to industrialized countries grew by only 1.5% per 
year.  And that is not just because South America exports more to Europe and Japan than 
it does to the United States.  If one separates out the United States as a destination, the 
non-US industrialized countries imports from LDCs grew by 2.5% per year, still faster 
than the 1.5% growth of Latin exports into those markets.   
I conclude that export promotion as a growth strategy is not working very well in these 
countries.  Partly that may be a short run problem of cyclic downturns in natural resource 
product markets and slow growth in total demand for the sorts of products Latin countries 
sell.  But the loss of market share time indicates that there is something else going on at 
the same time.  Latin America could be specialized in the wrong products or the wrong 
countries–ones where the overall growth in demand is low.  Or it could be that Latin 
export activities have failed to modernize and cut costs to more effectively compete 
against other developing countries.  Whatever the cause of the export slowdown is, no 
export-led growth strategy is going to work if it cannot produce an export growth rate 
higher than 2-3% per year. 
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Changes in the Distribution of Household Income per Capita in the 1990s 
Note:  All the series are national household income per capita with the exception of  
Jamaica which is household expenditure per capita, and Argentina and Uruguay which  
are urban distributions, not national.  Note that in Peru, the Saavedra &* Dias  
distribution uses the same areas for 1994 and 1996 that were surveyed in 1991. This  
may explain the differences with the S&H estimates.  The source abbreviations are:  
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